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 Executive summary 
An African model of peace operations 
Increasingly complex security environments are placing high demands 
on African peace operations, and complicating efforts at long-term 
peace- and statebuilding. From the experiences of the African Union 
(AU) and the sub-regions over the last decade, an African model of 
peace operations has emerged that is at odds with the mission 
scenarios and multi-dimensional assumptions that underpinned the 
original framework of the African Standby Force (ASF). The model 
indicates that: 
 The AU has used its peace operations to contain violent con-
flicts and to help stabilize the security situation in the affected 
countries. Simultaneously, the AU has used its special envoys and 
good offices mechanisms to seek political solutions.  
 African peace operations always operate alongside some form of 
sub-regional, UN or EU presence. This creates challenges of 
duplication, overlap and rivalry, but also provides the AU, sub-
regions, EU and UN with opportunities to collaborate, to coordinate 
their roles and to enter into burden-sharing arrangements.  
 African peace operations are funded and supported by the AU, 
African troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs, PCCs), and, 
in the case of the Ebola mission (ASEOWA) also by African private-
sector donations. Some sub-regions, like the Economic Community 
of West Africa (ECOWAS) have been able to support their own 
missions through community levies. Efforts are also underway at 
the pan-African level to identify alternative sources of funding. 
However, for now AU peace operations remain dependent on fund-
ing and support from international organizations and partners. This 
situation affects the ability of the AU to make independent 
decisions regarding the size, scope and duration of its missions. 
 African peace operations are predominantly short-duration mis-
sions that are handed over to UN missions as soon as basic stability 
has been restored. That makes joint planning, analysis and 
preparedness for handover central issues from the very start.  
 The AU experience in Burundi, Central African Republic, Mali and 
Somalia indicates that the only countries that are willing to 
contribute troops to missions where high-intensity combat-
operations are likely, are those that have a strategic interest in 
securing stability in that particular country or region. Whilst this 
may be a necessity, it can also have negative implications for how 
the mission is perceived by some factions in the host population. 
The AU should thus anticipate, monitor for, and be ready to 
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proactively manage the strategic consent, legitimacy and credibility 
of the mission towards the host population. 
The 2003 ASF framework provided for six deployment scenarios, but 
these have rarely matched actual deployment patterns. This framework 
needs to be adjusted, to bring it in line with the AU’s actual mission 
experiences. With the ASF due to achieve full operational capability in 
2015, the AU could benefit from a strategic review of African peace 
operations. That could enable it to prepare for the next decade on the 
basis of a shared strategic vision for ASF operations that is relevant to 
the current and near-future context, and adjusted to the strategic 
objectives of the AU’s Vision 2063 and Silencing the Guns. Key issues 
such an AU Panel should consider include: 
 What adjustments are needed for the ASF to remain relevant to 
changing conflict trends, and to enhance the effectiveness of AU 
peace operations? 
 How can the ASF’s Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) concept be 
harmonized with the African Capacity for the Immediate Response 
to Crises (ACIRC) concept?  
 What mission scenarios are most likely to require ASF deployments 
over the next decade? And on that basis, what specialized and 
niche capacities will the AU and regions need to develop or 
enhance? 
Strategic partnerships 
Regular discussions between strategic partners and the AU and 
RECs/RMs should make it easier to identify medium- to long-term 
shared norms, objectives and needs. Better inter-departmental coordi-
nation and the adoption of common objectives can help to avoid stove-
piping and duplication of efforts. To improve day-to-day relations, to 
minimize the remaining areas of tension, as well as to enable smooth 
handovers and transitions, joint conflict analyses should be conducted 
at the earliest possible date – to reach agreement on root causes and 
triggering factors, and preferably to develop joint strategies for preven-
tion and mediation. Sub-regions, with their in-depth local knowledge, 
could provide a platform for partners to perform these analyses.  
The subsidiarity principle needs further discussion and clarification, 
not least between the AU and RECs/RMs. African peace operations that 
entail the use of force require UN Security Council mandates under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, the deployment of African 
peace operations is likely to require the further authorization of the AU 
Peace and Security Council. If a REC/RM is mobilized to undertake such 
an operation, authorization may also be necessary from the REC/RM 
own legal authorizing body. For other mission types that do not require 
legal authority to use force, the body most proximate – the relevant 
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REC/RM – should be assumed to have responsibility for responding 
first. All actors responding to a conflict should be in close and regular 
communication, to enable assessments of comparative advantage, 
deployed capabilities and available resources, as well as efficiency and 
legitimacy. 
Mission support is critical to the success of African peace 
operations, but there has been insufficient investment in the planning 
and management of missions. The support pillar has been particularly 
neglected. Flexible ad hoc models are often developed in response to 
specific contexts. Because of overreliance on external support, there 
has been scant incentive to draft sufficient support models at the AU. 
The ad hoc approach is likely to continue, but there should be joint 
efforts at better planning and implementing support solutions, given 
the specific nature of African high-intensity peace operations. Although 
the models to be developed for future missions will be significantly 
influenced by the political will of partners, both the AU and the UN can 
identify what has worked and where improvements can be made.  
 As structured dialogue should be initiated involving the AU, UN, 
RECs/RMs and strategic partners, to develop mission-support 
models coherent with the high-intensity stabilization type of mis-
sions that have become characteristic of the African model of peace 
operations.  
 A more predictable international support system for regional 
operations is urgently needed. 
 The AU should consider establishing a dedicated branch within its 
Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) to improve its capacity 
for mission support for African peace operations. 
 The AU should explore how it can work together with the UN in 
developing strategic bases, tools, systems, stocks, procurement and 
outsourcing agreements. 
 The AU and the UN should, inter alia, consider options for how the 
AU can access resources from the UN’s regional logistics bases in 
Brindisi and Entebbe. 
 Standardize and harmonize TCC and PCC contributions to African 
peace operations, to enhance inter-operability and ease mission 
support.  
Civilian and police dimensions 
The roles of civilians in mission planning at the AU PSOD should be 
reinforced, and more civilian planning capacity should be added at the 
various levels of African peace operations. Planners must keep in mind 
the distinct nature of civilian roles in African peace operations – for 
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instance, the particularities of police functions in stabilization con-
texts. The AU needs to continue to develop the doctrinal framework 
and provide accepted guidelines on key concepts such as protection of 
civilians, gender, humanitarian support, and sexual exploitation and 
abuse. In this doctrinal framework, rule of law, police and civilian 
aspects should be reinforced. Finally, it is important to consider what 
core civilian capabilities are needed in high-intensity situations and 
what capacities could make the most impact. Political officers and 
human rights officers may be obvious candidates here, but also gender 
and conduct/discipline officers can help the mission to achieve its 
objectives as well as to prevent backlashes and unwanted conse-
quences. 
 Improve the civilian planning capacity at the AU PSOD as well as at 
the various levels of African peace operations. 
 Identify the distinct challenges of policing in African stabilization 
contexts and ensure that these are reflected in the doctrine, 
planning and conduct of policing tasks. 
 Prioritize training, rostering and recruitment of appropriate staff for 
civilian functions in African peace operations. 
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1.  African peace operations: trends and future scenarios?1 
African peace operations have developed considerably over the last 
decade since the first mission deployed by the African Union to 
Burundi. The African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Com-
munities (RECs) / Regional Mechanisms (RMs) have fielded over ten 
peace operations to Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, 
Darfur, Mali and Somalia. The AU has shown persistence and strength 
in the face of significant challenges in Somalia. New missions to Mali 
and CAR have been mounted on short notice and in challenging 
circumstances. In 2013 alone, a total of approximately 40,000 unifor-
med and civilian personnel were mandated to serve in AU peace 
operations (approximately 71,000, if the joint African Union–United 
Nations hybrid mission in Darfur is also taken into account).2 African 
regional actors have through these developments shown their 
indispensability as leading actors and partners in international efforts 
to enhance peace and security in Africa.  
Concurrently, significant institutional capacity and frameworks 
have been developed. The foundations for the African Standby Force 
(ASF) were laid over a decade ago. Much has changed since then, and a 
great deal has been achieved in the development of the ASF. These 
achievements include a suite of common policy documents, an annual 
continental training programme, improved in-country training stand-
ards, and standby forces that can be used collectively – albeit with only 
an initial operational capability at the moment, mainly for logistical 
and institutional reasons. The understanding of the role of police and 
civilian capacity in African peace operations is evolving. The AU has 
continued to refine its doctrines and guidelines, e.g. for the Protection 
of Civilians, Policing and Gender, to be able to respond to the high-
intensity operations now common in Africa. Good progress has also 
been made towards developing the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) 
concept. Further to this, concerted efforts must be made if the ASF is to 
achieve full operational capability (FOC), as scheduled for 2015. 
However, the objective of FOC should not detract from existing 
capabilities, as reflected in AU & REC/RM deployments to Somalia, Mali 
and CAR.  
                                                          
1  This report is an outcome of the seminar ‘The Future of African Peace Operations: 
Strategic Options 2015-2025’, co-hosted by the Nordic Africa Institute and the 
Training for Peace programme in Cape Town, 17-18 December 2015. The report is 
based on the proceedings of the seminar. A background paper was commissioned 
to introduce each of the seminar sessions, and the report and background papers 
will form the basis of an edited volume on the same topic. Annex 1 provides the 
agenda and participant list of the meeting. 
2  See Walter Lotze (2013) ‘Strengthening African Peace Support Operations’, 
available at: http://bit.ly/RzPSOn (accessed on 12 May 2014) and the Providing 
Peacekeepers project’s statistics available at 
http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/.  
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With the ASF due to achieve FOC in 2015, the question is how the 
ASF will be utilized in future, and more generally, the future direction 
ASF and African peace operations? The independent panel of experts 
appointed by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission in 
2013 to review the progress made by the ASF towards achieving FOC 
by 2015 held that the existing ASF Policy Framework should be 
reviewed, and be aligned with the realities of the African peace 
operation experience. With the ASF due to achieve full operational 
capability in 2015, the AU could benefit from a strategic review of 
African peace operations. That could enable it to prepare for the next 
decade on the basis of a shared strategic vision for ASF operations that 
is relevant to the current and near-future context, and adjusted to the 
strategic objectives of the AU’s Vision 2063 and Silencing the Guns.  
Looking ahead towards the post-2015 period also involves 
continuous development of the partnerships between African actors 
and the UN, the European Union (EU) and other actors with vested 
interests. The past decade has brought new and creative forms of 
cooperation in every mission, and many of these ad hoc collaborations 
are worth institutionalizing further. Partners are also undergoing 
change. The EU has established the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) to oversee foreign policy, including its engagement in peace 
operations. At the UN, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has nominated 
an Independent High-Level Panel to perform a strategic review of UN 
peace operations. Moreover, the UN will in 2015 undertake a review of 
its peacebuilding architecture, and establish new goals for global deve-
lopment following the expiry of the Millennium Development Goals. 
Climate change negotiations will be high on the global agenda in 
preparation for the Paris Climate Conference. During 2015, several 
global policymaking processes will highlight contemporary global 
challenges which form the environment to which peacekeepers are to 
respond. It is thus timely to focus on the future of African peace 
operations, and how African countries can best shoulder the ‘Africa 
rising’ narrative by continuing to develop effective and legitimate 
security institutions. 
Partnerships with African peace operation actors are recognized as 
essential from the perspective of the involved policy-makers and 
institutions. The increasing use of the phrase ‘strategic partnership’ 
signals the wish to clarify on all sides the shared long-term political 
objectives between African and non-African institutions and to 
regularize or institutionalize mechanisms in support of those objec-
tives.  
Based on discussions at The Future of African Peace Operations 
seminar, this report identifies common trends, ongoing developments 
and contemporary security requirements in the field of African peace 
operations, offering strategic recommendations to guide further 
developments for the coming decade.  
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2.  The context: the contemporary African security 
landscape 
Future African peace operations must reflect an understanding of the 
changing security context in Africa. African peace operations, in 
collaboration with international partners, are responding to a dynamic 
and high-intensity environment. A widely recognized lesson is that tra-
ditional principles of multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping missions are 
out of sync with the challenges facing African peace operations on the 
ground. These principles have informed the African Standby Force 
doctrine, but will need to be adjusted to reflect today’s realities.  
Asymmetric and hybrid security challenges, religious extremism 
and transnational criminal networks intersect in several countries, 
creating new challenges to peacekeeping. Captured in the term 
‘glocality’, the linkages between extremism, trafficking, smuggling and 
elite networks raise high demands to African peace operations and 
further complicate efforts at long-term peacebuilding and state-
building.3 Thanks to intensive efforts, piracy off the Horn of Africa has 
waned – but is on the rise in other areas. Militant groups and jihadist 
terrorist networks are changing their modus operandi; and in some 
areas, collusion between criminal or militant actors, business actors 
and state structures brings additional challenges. However, while 
religious extremism and terrorism are important factors, they should 
not be over-emphasized or allowed to mask deeper political and socio-
economic challenges that are at risk of becoming ‘securitized’.  
Complex local conflicts with regional and transnational dimensions 
pose threats to the protection of civilian populations and require care-
ful responses by African institutions. As seen in West Africa, pandemics 
such as Ebola pose immense challenges to areas with fragile statehood 
or widespread poverty. With this as an example, rapid intervention may 
be needed also in cases of instability or pandemics, and not only in 
extreme cases of mass atrocity crimes. At the same time, conventional 
threats to security will continue to exist in parallel with unpredictable 
and fragmented actors and drivers of conflict.  
As a result of these developments, the AU and the RECs/RMs have 
had to respond to increasingly complex security environments over the 
last decade. Has this resulted in the emergence of an African model of 
peace operations? And if so, how could we characterize such an African 
model of peace operations? 
                                                          
3  In recognition of the challenges posed to the African peace and security architec-
ture (APSA), the AUPSC held its first-ever meeting at the level of heads of states and 
government, devoted to prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extre-
mism. 455th Meeting Communiqué, 2 Sept 2014 Nairobi. See also 
http://www.foi.se/Documents/Eriksson%20et%20al%20%28red.%29,%20Illicit%
20Flows%20and%20African%20Security,%202014.pdf  
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a. AU peace operations 
The first characteristic of an AU model of peace operations is that the 
AU undertakes mostly stability operations. UN peacekeeping opera-
tions have traditionally been characterized by monitoring ceasefire 
agreements and helping to implement peace agreements. The typical 
UN operation is deployed after a peace agreement has been signed. 
Whereas the UN has also deployed operations to protect civilians in 
contexts where there is no peace agreement in place, these missions 
have been seen as exceptions to the rule. In contrast, all AU operations 
to date have been deployed amidst ongoing conflict, and have aimed at 
halting the conflict and stabilizing the security situation.  
AU missions have differed in important ways from UN peacekeeping 
practice and its guiding principles: consent, impartiality and non-use 
of force. UN peacekeeping must be non-confrontational and trans-
parent, in order to maintain the consent, trust and confidence of the 
parties to the ceasefire or peace agreement. Therefore, UN peacekeep-
ers are drawn from countries that are not associated with the conflict, 
and do not undertake covert or stealth operations. They operate in 
white and blue, so that they can be seen to be transparent and visible, 
and to show that they are not combatants – and thus not party to the 
conflict. 
By contrast, AU stability operations are ‘offensive’ in that a fragile 
peace needs to be enforced by suppressing the capability of aggressors 
to use force for political purposes. This means that AU troop-contribut-
ing countries (TCCs) may have to act offensively – for instance, by 
acquiring intelligence, operating with stealth operations, and as a 
result operating in green. Often, the only countries that are willing to 
contribute troops to such missions are those that have a strategic 
interest in securing stability, usually encompassing stability and order 
of a whole (sub)region. Thus, the actual experience of AU stability 
operations has, at many levels, evolved differently from the UN 
peacekeeping model on which the ASF has largely been modelled. 
The second characteristic of an AU model of peace operations is that 
these are predominantly short duration missions that are handed over 
to UN missions as soon as basic stability has been restored. All these 
African peace operations have subsequently been taken over by UN 
peace operations with six to 18 months, except for the AU operation in 
Somalia, AMISOM. 
AMISOM is the exception, as the AU had to fight an intensive and 
sustained counter-insurgency campaign to dislodge al-Shabaab. 
Despite considerable gains, the conditions are not yet ripe for a UN mis-
sion to take over. As an exception and in recognition of the internatio-
nal and global significance of the work carried out by the AU, the UN 
Security Council authorized the use of its assessed contributions to 
support the AU mission. 
Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot and John Karlsrud 
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The third characteristic is that these missions have been funded and 
supported by African TCCs and police-contributing countries (PCCs), as 
well as international partners. This financial dimension has been an 
important factor in determining the size and scope of the missions, as 
well as their length. AU missions have had to make do with less person-
nel and less resources than a UN mission in the same theatre. For 
instance, in Darfur the UN mission that followed on from AMIS had 
approximately three times as many personnel and four times the 
budget. The same trend can be observed in the transitions in Mali and 
CAR.  
As these missions are funded and supported by the international 
community, the AU and RECs/RMs cannot independently take decisi-
ons on the mandate, size and duration of these missions. There is a 
serious attempt underway to consider alternative ways of funding the 
AU. A team of experts led by President Obasanjo has proposed various 
ways in which the AU can raise its own funding. For instance, a levy of 
USD 10 on plane tickets to Africa and USD 2 on hotel accommodation 
could raise more than USD 700 million annually.4 These measures 
have not been adopted, but they serve as examples that it is not impos-
sible for the AU to generate at least some of its own funding. The steady 
rise in the defence budgets of many African member states, with a 65% 
average increase over the last decade,5 also indicates a growing ability 
to fund and support African peace operations. If this were to happen, it 
would probably give the AU a considerably wider range of options. 
However, in the near term the AU seems constrained to the stability 
operations model. 
The African model that has emerged over the past decade is thus one 
of stabilization missions, relatively short-lived, undertaken alongside 
UN and other political and humanitarian–development missions before 
being handed over to UN missions. These missions are financed and 
supported by the international community, which considerably limits 
the ability of the AU or RECs/RMs to determine their mandates, scope, 
size and duration independently. 
The AU has not made a strategic choice to focus its efforts on 
stabilization missions. Rather, it ended up taking on this task because a 
unique set of push and pull factors converged to create the conditions 
                                                          
4  Progress Report of the High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the Afri-
can Union, 15 July 2014, SC7749, African Union, Available At: http://ccpau.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/obasanjo-panel-progress-report-assembly-au-18-xix-
2012-_e.pdf 
5  Perlo-Freeman, Sam and Carina Solmirano (2014) SIPRI Fact Sheet 2014: Trends in 
World Military Expenditure, 2013. Stockholm:  Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, p. 4. See also The Economist (2014) ‘Uppin’ arms’, 24  
November 2014. Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/11/daily-chart-13. 
Accessed 19 January 2015.  
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in which the AU peace operations model became one of stability opera-
tions. Primary influences were the violent nature of the conflicts con-
fronting the AU; the UN peacekeeping model, which prevents the UN 
from deploying peace operations until a ceasefire or peace agreement is 
in place; and the support models available for financing AU operations. 
For this reason, the AU needs to define and enhance conceptual clarity 
over the term ‘stabilization’.6 Internally, that will help in defining 
strategy and doctrine and in planning for upcoming roles. 
If the actual experience of the AU over the last decade has differed 
so greatly from what was envisaged under the ASF framework, is it not 
time to adjust the ASF model so that the capacities being developed can 
better reflect the kinds of missions the AU is likely to undertake?7 What 
specialized and niche capacities will the AU and RECs/RMs need to 
develop or enhance, so as to ensure they are prepared for the kinds of 
operations they are likely to be called on to undertake over the next 
decade? How can the AU achieve the right balance between necessary 
capacities (including mobility, information gathering, specialized and 
formed police units, troop protection, political functions) and resource 
constraints?  
b. Operationalizing the ASF, the RDC and harmonizing with the 
ACIRC 
The African Standby Force and its Rapid Deployment Capability are 
expected to be fully operational by December 2015. Efforts are 
underway to achieve FOC through the AMANI exercise cycle and the 
implementation of the revised ASF–African Capacity for the Immediate 
Response to Crises (ACIRC) Roadmap. The latter attained initial opera-
tional capability in December 2014. Despite the decision by the AU 
Assembly in 2014 to ensure harmonization of the ASF and ACIRC, both 
processes seem to have proceeded in parallel or at best through 
selective attempts to harmonize the two mechanisms.  
Some have criticized the ACIRC for distracting attention from the 
goal of operationalizing the ASF; others see the ACIRC as a way of 
breathing new life into the ASF. With the ASF becoming operational in 
2015, its legitimacy will be strengthened, and it will continue to be the 
main framework for African peace operations. Going forward, there will 
be a need to harmonize the RDC and ACIRC concepts, and to adjust the 
ASF to be more focused and more efficient. While the ASF may not be 
deployed as such, it will continue to be of significant value for future 
operations as a repository of doctrine, standards and training guide-
                                                          
6  The term ‘stabilization’ has been quite contentious. See Jan Bachmann (2014), 
‘Policing Africa: The US Military and visions of crafting ‘good order’,’ Security Dia-
logue 45 (2): 119–136. 
7  See, for instance, Cedric de Coning (2014) ‘Enhancing the Efficiency of the African 
Standby Force: The Case for a Shift To a Just-in-Time Rapid Response Model?’, 
Conflict Trends 2/2014, ACCORD, available at http://bit.ly/1nz8wT6. 
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lines, providing a common understanding of a distinctly African 
approach to PSOs. 
Drawing on experience with African peace operations to date, there 
should be further reflection on the various scenarios most likely for the 
deployment of African peace operations. Experiences from these 
operations should also feed into the future development of the ASF. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of interventions is a central point, and one 
that requires collective responses on the continent. Actual deployed 
capability to date testifies to the African contribution and commitment, 
even beyond the ambitions set out in the ASF concept. The standby 
brigades as originally conceived were highly dependent on a ‘collective 
security’ assumption, while in practice African states respond to con-
flicts more on a case-by-case basis. Ensuring prior AU authorization is 
important, sometimes for political reasons. Significantly, individual 
states with stakes involved often choose to act rapidly – usually a coali-
tion of regional states joining in. the AU Peace and Security Council, 
and the UN Security Council, will often legitimize these missions just as 
they are deploying, or retrospectively. Thus, a lead nation concept 
seems to match better with evolving practice. Additionally, integrating 
such a concept into the multilateralist framework of the ASF can help 
to guard against abuse by strong powers.  
Planning and adaptation of the ASF must take into account the fact 
that most AU missions are handed over to the UN within 6–18 months, 
making harmonization of standards highly desirable. To enable 
smoother transitions, the UN Security Council should also consider 
funding training and equipping forces, and preparing their basis, 
starting six months prior to the transfer of authority to a UN mission, as 
was done in CAR. Second, although handover to the UN is the most 
plausible route, it is not guaranteed, so AU missions should still be 
planned as distinct and comprehensive but as ‘minimal’ as possible. 
Most AU operations to date have been stabilization operations that 
created the conditions necessary for the UN to follow up with a multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operation. That said, a transfer of authority 
to the UN must not become the overriding objective of the operation: 
the case-specific political objectives in themselves should be primary, 
and the AU mission must itself include the components and capabili-
ties necessary for achieving them. Therefore, the political objective and 
peacebuilding process need to be considered at the planning stage, 
taking into account the vital role of civilians and police for longer-term 
stability and peacebuilding. However, as yet the AU cannot raise the 
internal resources it would need to deploy other types of more 
comprehensive multi-dimensional missions. 
3. AU peace operations partnerships 
The UN–AU relationship has deepened and evolved, and has facilitated 
the deployment of a record number of peacekeepers in Africa in recent 
years. In 2014, the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the AU 
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Commission’s Peace and Security Department signed a Joint Frame-
work for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which will 
frame and guide their joint work.8 The UN has experienced a rise in the 
number of operations during a period of financial austerity, with 
increasing deployments to situations that stretch the understanding of 
what situations UN peacekeeping is intended to cover.9 The UN thus 
understands the value of the AU playing the role that the AU itself 
wants to play, and there is a shared need to improve cooperation 
between the AU and the UN. In some circles there is still a perception of 
an imbalance in the relationship, although on day-to-day planning and 
management the UN works with the AU as equals. For example, the 
annual meeting is between the members of the two councils, not 
between the two councils, as some UNSC permanent members are keen 
to stress. 
Still-remaining areas of tension include: differing ideas on the 
preconditions for deployment and transitions (as the AU is often called 
upon to deploy to active conflicts, where there is no viable ceasefire 
and/or peace agreement); differing interpretations of norms such as 
‘protection of civilians’ or ‘unconstitutional’ changes of government; 
differing conceptualizations and approaches to the use of force and 
combat roles in peace operations; challenges and conflicts surrounding 
the principle of subsidiarity; and proposals and expectations for 
financing AU peace operations. Identified shared purposes help actors 
stay committed, which is the aim of having a strategic partnership. For 
the AU to be an effective partner, what is needed is a forward-looking 
perspective – not continuing turf battles and competition. 
The situation on the ground has created a general interest in closer 
cooperation among the AU, the UN and the EU, as well as subregional 
organizations. This has been exemplified in recent meetings between 
these bodies, and bilaterally as well. More trilateral cooperation 
between the AU, EU and UN could be pursued to ensure that common 
objectives are reached.  
To improve the strategic relationship between the AU and its part-
ners, there is a need for a predictable, systematic and institutionalized 
partnerships. This will gradually reduce the negative effects of the 
underlying inequalities and asymmetries in power. Also essential are 
regular conversations and discussions on common norms, goals and 
needs – this will be of mutual benefit for the partners. There is also a 
need to promote inter-departmental coordination and adoption of 
                                                          
8  See AU (2013) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union–
United Nations partnership: the need for greater coherence (AU doc. PSC/ 
AHG/3.(CCCXCVII), 23 September 2013). 
9  John Karlsrud (2015) ‘The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace 
Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC 
and Mali’, Third World Quarterly 36 (1): 40–54. 
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common objectives to avoid stove-piping and duplication of efforts. 
While recognizing the value of diversity, efforts to develop more joint 
conflict analyses should be central, to enable agreement on root 
causes, on triggering factors and on how to prevent conflict and work 
with mediation. The RECs, with their in-depth subregional and local 
knowledge, will be important partners and could provide a platform for 
partners to perform these analyses.  
There is growing acceptance for increased burden-sharing between 
the AU and its partners. African peace operations should not be solely 
internationally funded nor African-funded. African countries will need 
to increase their financial support to African peace operations.  
a. The principle of subsidiarity and the relationship between the UN, 
AU, RECs/RMs 
The principle of subsidiarity lies at the heart of the debate on UN, AU, 
RECs/RMs relations, resurfacing at regular intervals. Two fundamental 
principles are in tension when dealing with conflicts on the African 
continent – also elsewhere in the world. First, authority is drawn from 
the global to the local level, with the UN Security Council as the source 
of origin. Second, ownership runs in the opposite direction from the 
local to the global level, where proximity is a decisive factor. These 
lines of authority, accountability and ownership follow each other 
closely, but are strengthened in opposite directions. At the intersection 
of these lines we find the African Union. The experience of the African 
Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) highlighted many of the unresolved 
tensions and unclear divisions of roles between the UN, AU and, in this 
case, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS). The 
transitions from MICOPAX, the mission of the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), to the AU’s African Support Mission in 
Central Africa Republic (MISCA) in December 2013, followed 
approximately six months later by the transition from MISCA to the UN 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central 
African Republic (MINUSCA), reflected a significant improvement and 
showed how quickly the UN, AU and RECs learn from previous 
experiences and adapt to new realities. 
These experiences show that, when it comes to the authority to use 
non-consensual force,10 all peace operations require authorization 
from the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The 
AFISMA experience further confirmed that the UN Security Council will 
                                                          
10  In this context, the non-consensual use of force refers to those cases where the AU 
or a REC/RM is not requested by a state to intervene on its behalf. If a state 
requests another state or a regional body to assist in acting against an insurgency, 
no UN Security Council authority is needed, because the state is acting under its 
own sovereign authority. However, if the AU or a REC/RM should wish to mobilize 
and deploy a peace operation under the auspices of the ASF to respond to such a 
request, then it is conceivable that the Peace and Security Council would need to 
authorize the use of the ASF. 
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no longer authorize an African REC/RM to undertake a peace operation, 
as with ECOMOG and ECOMIL in the past, without the consent and 
authority of the AU Peace and Security Council. All African peace 
operations to date have been undertaken by the African Union Commis-
sion, in close cooperation with the relevant REC/RMs and troop- and 
police-contributing countries. However, should a scenario arise where 
a REC/RM is called on to undertake a peace operation that requires the 
use of non-consensual force, authorization by the UN Security Council 
and the AU Peace and Security Council would be required. From the 
perspective of international law, the authority to use force thus resides 
with the UN Security Council, and practice as well as precedent 
indicate that the deployment of African peace operations will require 
the further authorization of the AU Peace and Security Council. If a 
REC/RM is mobilized to undertake such an operation, further 
authorization may be necessary from the REC/RM’s own legal authoriz-
ing body.  
In addition to the legal dimension, the principle of subsidiarity also 
has a practical dimension: the body nearest to the problem is likely to 
have the greatest practical and operational credibility and know-how to 
solve the problem. Thus all conflict management approaches in Africa 
will rely, in the first instance, on the advice, local knowledge and 
capacity of immediate neighbours, the regional body and the continen-
tal body. In some cases, due to conflicts of interest or the distraction of 
other crises, the REC/RM may not be able to act as a first responder – 
but, as a general rule, the body closest to the problem will have 
responsibility for responding to an emerging crisis. If necessary, help 
can be sought from the next-highest authority or bilateral partners, 
until eventually the assistance of the UN may be sought. In reality, it is 
acknowledged that in most conflicts today, the relevant REC, the AU 
and the UN are all likely to be present and to have prior existing 
engagements and commitments. However, whenever the question 
arises as to who should lead a particular initiative, and provided that it 
does not require legal authority to use force, the body nearest to the 
problem – the relevant REC/RM – should be assumed to have 
responsibility for responding first. That said, all the actors should 
coordinate closely with each other; and while the principle of 
subsidiarity should be a guide, it should not prevent the relevant 
REC/RM, the AU or the UN from choosing a different course of action, 
on the basis of comparative advantages, deployed capabilities and 
available resources.  
b. Mission support 
A well-functioning system for mission support is a critical factor for the 
success of peace operations, but continues to be the weakest and most 
neglected pillar of African peace operations. The difficult security 
environments in which African peace operations operate entail various 
challenges as regards mission support. Efforts are underway to further 
increase the support provided by AU member states for African PSOs, 
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but it is also important to ask whether a more predictable international 
support system for regional operations could be developed. Globaliza-
tion in this context implies that all conflicts have causes and effects 
linked to developments in the global system, and it is thus in the 
interest of the maintenance of global peace and security to find better 
and more predictable ways in which regional and international part-
ners can work together in mandating and undertaking regional 
operations. 
There has been insufficient investment in planning and manage-
ment of missions, in particular the support pillar. It is obviously 
difficult to plan for operations when the context is rapidly changing 
and there is little knowledge of what assets and capabilities will be 
available. Compounding these challenges, everything – from aviation 
and fuel to communications – has been dependent on the partners, 
which is an obvious impediment to mission planning and execution. 
Greater capacity for mission support is needed at the level of the AU 
and RECs/RMs. The AU should consider establishing a dedicated 
branch within its Peace Support Operations Division for this purpose. 
The UN has been improving its model for mission support and the AU 
and the UN should, inter alia, consider options for how the AU can 
access resources from the UN regional logistics bases in Brindisi and 
Entebbe. The AU should explore how it can cooperate with the UN on 
the development of strategic bases, tools, systems, stocks, produrement 
and outsourcing agreements. 
On the ground, parallel standards exist for troops deployed to UN 
and AU in the same theatre. Reimbursement rates and support are pro-
vided according to the mission to which one belongs, not the country or 
situation to which one is deployed. The inequality of reimbursements 
also impacts on what member-state contributions are made available to 
what missions (AU vs UN). The life-span of equipment decreases and 
maintenance costs increase because of the nature of the African peace 
operations. For example, in Somalia the budget for fuel or tyres for 
vehicles becomes exhausted as tyres are frequently rendered useless 
because of the prevalence, far beyond mission-planning assumptions, 
of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  
To date, none of the invented support models are coherent with the 
type of high-intensity stabilization/peace enforcement missions that 
the AU is performing. There has not been structured dialogue on this 
matter between the AU, UN, RECs and partners, and new models are 
developed for each mission. Flexible models are developed in response 
to specific contexts, reflecting continued ad hoc inventions here and 
now. At the AU, there has not been much incentive to draft sufficient 
support models, because of the reliance on external support. UNSOA, 
in support of AMISOM, has been the best model to date, and can be 
further developed. In this security context there are advantages to 
having models that are ‘lean and mean’, with less staff working in an 
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integrated manner with AU. However, the UNSOA model could be 
improved by separating civilian from military personnel to a lesser 
degree. The ad hoc approach is likely to continue, but there should be 
joint efforts at better planning and implementing support solutions. 
Although the models that will be developed for future missions also 
will be significantly influenced by the political will of partners, the AU 
and the UN can identify what has worked and where improvements can 
be made.  
Contingent-owned equipment (COE) remains a significant challenge. 
Not all TCCs and PCCs have their own equipment, so one option would 
be to establish a pool of equipment that these can draw from. TCCs 
could be provided with loans to buy equipment delivered directly to the 
missions, for subsequent reimbursement.  
Only the USA and the NATO countries combined can undertake 
strategic airlifts, and commercial strategic airlifts are beyond the 
financial limits available to the AU or the UN. Commercial logistics is 
considerably more effective than the UN in combat situations, given the 
increasing risk-aversion of the UN system.  
New and bold ideas for funding mechanisms are needed from AU 
officials as well as partners. The 2008 Prodi Panel made such a bold 
and practical suggestion for more systematic and predictable financing 
mechanisms, opening up for the establishment of trust funds and use 
of UN assessed contributions to fund African missions during short 
time-limited periods and based on UN Security Council and General 
Assembly approval.11 
There is a need to further standardize and harmonize TCC and PCC 
contributions to African peace operations. This will enhance inter-
operability and facilitate support. The development of standards 
should not merely replicate standards for UN peacekeeping, but take 
into account the particular nature of African high-intensity PSOs. 
4. Civilian and police dimensions of African peace 
operations 
Multi-dimensionality remains critical to African peace operations, but it 
is important to articulate more clearly what the AU means by ‘multi-
dimensional’ and what roles civilians and police can play. Military 
solutions should be used as a last resort – and even then, they have 
their limitations in facilitating sustainable political outcomes or set the 
stage for longer-term peacebuilding activities. All AU missions have 
military, police and civilian components under civilian leadership. 
However, the military dimension currently outweighs the other, in 
numbers as well as in importance, even  though both the police and the 
                                                          
11  A/63/666-S/2008/813 Comprehensive review of the whole of peacekeeping 
operations in all their aspects, 31 December 2008. 
Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot and John Karlsrud 
 
20 
civilian components are central for facilitating the transition to longer-
term stability and mission exit.  
The civilian dimensions of African peace operations are likely to be 
somewhat slimmer than in UN missions due to the high-intensity 
environment. Civilian functions thus tend to be gathered under broad 
headings – like Protection of Civilians, which integrates perspectives 
on human rights, international humanitarian law, gender, sexual 
exploitation and abuse, and management of detainees; Stabilization, 
which integrates perspectives on security and governance, conflict 
management, quick-impact projects and institution-building; and 
Humanitarian Support, which integrates issues related to civilian–
military coordination, and security of internally displaced persons and 
refugees. All the same, it is the officers who conduct work in these 
areas that will be of paramount importance to the successful 
conclusion of the missions they support.  
To ensure that missions improve their chances of success, civilians 
have been given an increased role in the planning elements of the AU. 
This is a positive trend that should be supported and reinforced. It is 
necessary to continue to develop the doctrinal framework and provide 
accepted guidelines on key concepts such as protection of civilians, 
gender, humanitarian support, and combatting sexual exploitation and 
abuse. The military dimension of stabilization has been over-empha-
sized, to the detriment of a focus on rule of law, police and civilian 
aspects. Planning must also reflect the various realities existing in 
parallel on the ground – one part of a country may enjoy relative sta-
bility while another could be embroiled in conflict.  
Police support in stabilization contexts will necessarily provide 
distinct challenges that should be reflected in the doctrine, planning 
and conduct of policing tasks. Merely copying and pasting UN doctrine 
will not be sufficient: it is essential to understand and reflect upon the 
specifics of policing in African peace operations. Missions in high-
intensity environments need Formed Police Units (FPUs) equipped with 
armed personnel carriers (APCs), to be relevant to the tasks of the mis-
sion. Police contributions should be deployed with the training they 
need, and training should focus on strengthening the capacity of the 
local police. It is also important to address the larger range of rule-of-
law challenges, of which the police are only one part.  
Further work is needed to provide the right people at the right time 
and at the right place. Guidance on training, rostering and recruitment 
needs has been developed, but more efforts are needed to generate 
appropriate staff on time. Finally, it is essential to consider what core 
civilian capabilities are needed in high-intensity situations, and what 
capacities could make the most impact. Political officers and human 
rights officers are obviously important – but also gender and conduct 
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and discipline officers can help the mission to achieve its objectives, 
while also preventing backlashes and unwanted consequences. 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
The AU and the RECs/RMs have had to respond to increasingly complex 
security environments over the last decade, and the original African 
model of peace operations is now at odds with the mission scenarios 
and assumptions that underpinned the ASF framework. A lead nation 
concept could improve ASF efficiency. Also in the future, the ASF 
should remain the main framework of African peace operations. It is 
important to harmonize the RDC and ACIRC concepts, to reflect further 
on the various mission scenarios most likely for deployment of African 
peace operations, and to focus on the specialized and niche capacities 
the AU and RECs/RMs need to develop or enhance.  
There is a need for regular conversations and discussions among 
strategic partners on common norms, goals and needs. Further, it is 
important to promote inter-departmental coordination and the 
adoption of common objectives to avoid stove-piping and duplication 
of efforts. Efforts to develop more joint conflict analyses should be 
central on this agenda, to enable agreement on root causes, on 
triggering factors and on how to prevent conflict and work with medi-
ation. The RECs, with their in-depth subregional and local knowledge, 
could provide a platform for partners to perform these analyses.  
The subsidiarity principle will require further discussions and 
clarification, not least between the AU and RECs/RMs. Because of their 
offensive nature, stability operations require UN Security Council 
mandates: in line with international law, all peace operations that may 
use non-consensual force need authorization from the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Practice and precedent indicate 
that the deployment of African peace operations will require the further 
authority of the AU Peace and Security Council. If a REC/RM is mobil-
ized to undertake such an operation further authorization may be 
necessary from the REC/RM’s own legal authorizing body. For other 
mission types that do not require legal authority to use force, the body 
nearest to the problem – the relevant REC/RM – should be assumed to 
have responsibility for responding first. However, all actors should 
coordinate closely, and response should be based on assessments of 
comparative advantages, deployed capabilities and available 
resources. 
A structured dialogue should be initiated among the AU, UN, RECs 
and partners to develop support models that are coherent with the 
high-intensity stabilization/peace enforcement type of missions that 
the AU is performing. A more predictable international support system 
for regional operations is urgently needed. 
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For improved capacity for mission support at the AU level, the RECs/ 
RMs and the AU should consider establishing a dedicated branch 
within its Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) for this purpose. 
The AU and the UN should consider, inter alia, options for how the AU 
can access resources from the UN regional logistics bases in Brindisi 
and Entebbe. The AU can work together with the UN on the develop-
ment of strategic bases, tools, systems, stocks, procurement and 
outsourcing agreements. 
The roles of civilians in mission planning at the AU PSOD should be 
reinforced, and more civilian planning capacity should be added at the 
various levels of African peace operations. These planners need to keep 
in mind the distinct nature of civilian roles in African peace operations 
– for instance, the particularities of police functions in stabilization 
contexts. The AU should continue to develop its doctrinal framework 
and provide accepted guidelines on key concepts such as protection of 
civilians, gender, humanitarian support, and combatting sexual 
exploitation and abuse. Within this doctrinal framework, it will be 
important to reinforce the rule of law, police and civilian aspects. 
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